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Brands and Cooper: Getting Serious About Strategy in the South China Sea

GET TING SERIOUS ABOUT STR ATEGY IN THE
SOUTH CHINA SEA
Hal Brands and Zack Cooper

A

merica is suffering from a strategy deficit in the South China Sea. For nearly
a decade—and at accelerated speed since 2014—Beijing has been salami
slicing its way to a position of primacy in that critical international waterway,
while eroding the norms and interests Washington long has sought to defend.
To date, however, Washington has struggled to articulate an effective response.
The Obama administration opposed Chinese maritime expansion rhetorically
and worked to improve the overall American military and geopolitical posture in
the Asia-Pacific. Yet the administration only occasionally mustered the leverage
necessary to check China’s quest for dominance of the South China Sea, and often
it was unable even to impose substantial long-term costs on Beijing for its shortterm assertiveness. For its part, the Trump administration has yet to formulate or
implement a coherent South China Sea strategy, and it has swung from suggesting that America might deny Chinese access to islands in the South China Sea
physically—something approaching an act of war—to appearing subsequently to
deprioritize the issue.
Today, the situation in the South China Sea is reaching a critical stage as
Chinese advances accumulate, America’s room for maneuver diminishes, and
observers throughout the region wonder whether the United States is up to the
challenge. And yet Washington still is searching for a strategy.
Part of the trouble, no doubt, lies in the sheer difficulty of meeting a calculated Chinese offensive that is simultaneously audacious and subtle, one that is
changing the geopolitical status quo profoundly but incrementally, in ways designed not to provoke a decisive response. Yet getting America’s South China Sea
strategy right also requires thinking more-systematically about what Washington
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should seek to achieve and what it should hazard in the effort. It has become common, in recent years, to hear calls for the United States to get tough with China
over its illegal island building, militarization of disputed features, and coercion of
U.S. allies and partners.1 Yet it is far less common to hear in-depth discussion of
what the long-term goal of such a program should be, whether that goal is actually achievable, and how much cost and risk the United States should accept along
the way.2 This is dangerous, because it increases the possibility that America may
commit itself to goals that cannot be obtained at a reasonable price, or simply
may follow a muddled, confused policy on a crucial geopolitical issue.
What is needed is to elevate the strategic debate by identifying clearly—and
assessing rigorously—the main options for countering China’s offensive in the
South China Sea. Four basic strategies are available.
1.	 Rollback aims to push China back from its recent gains in the South China
Sea and restore the status quo ante; it accepts a substantial likelihood of
military conflict as the price of attaining this ambitious objective.
2.	 Containment accepts Chinese gains made to date, in recognition of just
how difficult and dangerous it would be to reverse those gains, but draws
the line firmly—including by threat or use of military force—against
further advances.
3.	 Offset does not seek to prevent further Chinese encroachments in the
South China Sea, but aims to penalize Beijing for destabilizing actions,
while also offsetting their impact through measures that strengthen the
overall U.S. position in the region.
4.	 Accommodation accepts Chinese dominance of the South China Sea, on
the theory that it is simply too costly and perilous to compete with Beijing
in its own back yard, and instead seeks to ensure a smooth transition to
Chinese regional primacy.
None of these strategies is perfect, and each has substantial liabilities that accompany its advantages. In the final analysis, however, a strategy that blends the
most-compelling aspects of containment and offset is best suited for protecting
U.S. interests at a reasonable cost—and for steering the proper course in a turbulent South China Sea.
THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
The situation in the South China Sea is both complex and simple. The complexity
lies in the fact that this body of water is the subject of multiple disputes among
China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and most recently
Indonesia.3 The simplicity lies in the fact that only one of those claimants—
China—has been making a concerted drive for regional primacy.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/3
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In 2009, China surprised regional observers by submitting to the United Nations its so-called nine-dash-line map, which claimed up to 90 percent of the
South China Sea. Since then, China has become increasingly coercive in dealing with its South China Sea neighbors, through measures such as asserting
“indisputable sovereignty” over disputed features and seizing effective control
of Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 2012. Meanwhile, China has upgraded its facilities in the Paracel Islands, particularly the military base on Woody
(Yongxing / Phu Lam) Island, which now houses a military-grade airfield, aircraft
shelters, and missile batteries. Since 2013, moreover, China has “reclaimed”
roughly 3,200 acres of land in the Spratly Islands, compared with just 120 acres
for Vietnam and less (or none) for the other claimants.4 Beijing has created artificial islands and military bases on seven features in the Spratlys, three of which
now house three-kilometer-long airfields with aircraft shelters, advanced radars,
and point defenses.
In addition to expanding its military footprint, Beijing has announced and
enforced fishing and resource-exploitation restrictions in various parts of the
South China Sea, empowered its coast guard and maritime militia to interfere
with the vessels of other nations, regularly allowed Chinese-flagged fishing boats
to exploit endangered species in disputed areas, and made clear that it intends
to disregard any legal challenges to its claims. In mid-2016, for instance, Beijing
simply brushed aside the ruling of the arbitral tribunal that largely invalidated
the nine-dash line and found that many of China’s maritime claims and activities
were not in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea.5 Finally, Beijing has become more assertive in challenging foreign activity in
the South China Sea by increasing its own military presence in the area, harassing
American planes and vessels (as well as those of other countries), and warning
Washington against “interfering” in China’s ongoing maritime disputes.6
By any reasonable standard, then, recent years have seen a pattern of Chinese
rhetoric and behavior geared toward making Beijing the dominant power in the
South China Sea.7 Chinese gains have been incremental rather than sudden, and
Beijing has calibrated its actions carefully to avoid triggering a military clash
with Washington or galvanizing the region to balance against it. Nonetheless,
the cumulative results have been significant. “In short order,” writes one former
Obama administration official, “China has laid the foundation for control of the
South China Sea.”8
So why does any of this matter to the United States? Some American experts
on Asia assert that it does not—that Washington’s own “core interests are not
really at stake” in the South China Sea.9 After all, the United States has taken no
position on who has sovereignty over the South China Sea and the various features therein, other than to argue that the disputes should be resolved peacefully
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
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through negotiations free from coercion. Why, then, should Washington take
risks to prevent Beijing from controlling and exploiting maritime features that
the United States maintains might be Chinese in the first place?10 The answer is
that China’s offensive is not simply a matter of who controls “a bunch of rocks on
the other side of the world”; it is a challenge to a series of key U.S. interests in the
South China Sea and the broader Asia-Pacific region.11
From an economic perspective, trade through the South China Sea amounts
to roughly U.S.$3.4 trillion per year, and many U.S. allies and partners are highly
dependent on both the comPart of the trouble . . . lies in the sheer diffimerce that passes through that
culty of meeting a calculated Chinese offensive waterway and the resources
that is simultaneously audacious and subtle,
—from fish to oil and natural
one that is changing the geopolitical status quo gas—that can be extracted
profoundly but incrementally, in ways defrom it.12 Were China to besigned not to provoke a decisive response.
come the predominant power
in the area, it would have the
capability to put a choke hold on one of the world’s most important trade routes if
it wished to do so—or Beijing simply could use the implicit threat of doing so to
coerce and influence other countries that rely disproportionately on this dynamic
portion of the global commons.
From a military perspective, China’s seven bases in the Spratlys (and its upgraded facilities in the Paracels) greatly extend the reach of both its antiaccess
forces and its power-projection capabilities. Chinese bases in the Spratlys are
some five hundred miles south of Woody Island, putting new areas at risk from
Chinese missiles and aircraft. In peacetime, these bases provide Beijing with
facilities to help it exert control over the South China Sea using military, coast
guard, and maritime militia forces.13 In wartime, these bases would be vulnerable
to U.S. attacks—but nonetheless they would allow Chinese forces to complicate
American operations in support of the Philippines or other allies and partners.14
Finally, from a geopolitical perspective, the stakes are high indeed in the
South China Sea. The United States long has sought to prevent any rival power
from dominating East Asia or a significant part thereof. America’s standing in
the Asia-Pacific is largely dependent on its ability to uphold existing rules of
the road, such as freedom of navigation and peaceful resolution of disputes, and
face down challenges to the region’s stability and order, as well as its openness.
Thus, permitting Chinese control over a critical part of a critical region would
represent a major strategic setback for the United States; it also might embolden
China to attempt to revise the status quo elsewhere, whether in Taiwan, the East
China Sea, or the Indian Ocean.15 Not least, it would signal to regional observers
that Washington no longer can play its traditional role in the Asia-Pacific, and
thereby would encourage regional players to accommodate Beijing rather than
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/3
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join with the United States to balance against an increasingly assertive China.
Countries in Southeast Asia have been explicit about their need for continued
U.S. engagement, lest they be forced to bandwagon with China, as the Philippines
has done under Rodrigo Duterte.16 Thus, from a geopolitical standpoint, the
struggle over the South China Sea is not about “rocks,” but about whether states
in Southeast Asia and the greater Indo-Pacific region will align with the United
States or China.
Although U.S. interests in the South China Sea are clear, U.S. policy there
remains muddled.17 The Obama administration frequently warned China not to
carry out “reclamation, construction, or militarization” in the South China Sea,
but these statements created expectations among states in Southeast Asia that
U.S. leaders were unwilling to fulfill. Meanwhile, Washington worked diligently
to strengthen U.S. diplomatic relationships and military capabilities in the region,
yet U.S. leaders refused to comment publicly on whether the U.S.-Philippine
Mutual Defense Treaty would apply in the South China Sea. The United States
also encouraged Southeast Asian states to push back against Chinese coercion in
both diplomatic and legal forums, and the White House worked with Congress
to begin upgrading the maritime awareness and security capabilities of allies and
partners in the region. Yet, as well-intentioned as these efforts were, the Obama
administration ended its second term with a more divided Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), despite China’s construction spree on disputed
features and coercion of ASEAN members. Beijing’s lead over its neighbors in
military and other coercive capabilities also remained enormous, and in most
cases—most notably the seizure of Scarborough Shoal in 2012—Beijing simply
went ahead with reclamation, construction, militarization, or other destabilizing
actions despite U.S. warnings or attempts at mediation. As Obama’s presidency
ended, there was a growing perception in the region—and even among some senior American policy makers—that the administration had drawn redlines that it
ultimately had not upheld, and that too often it had failed to slow, let alone halt,
China’s drive for primacy.18
So far, the Trump administration too has struggled to articulate an effective
approach. Administration officials initially took a hard line, with Secretary of
State–designate Rex Tillerson suggesting in his confirmation hearing that Washington might prevent Beijing physically from accessing its artificial islands in the
Spratlys.19 Then the issue appeared to recede from the policy agenda as the administration focused on bilateral trade and North Korea as the dominant issues
in U.S.-China relations. Although the U.S. military has conducted freedom-ofnavigation operations (FONOPs) to challenge China’s (and other states’) excessive claims, the administration has given the impression—which has been noted
in key countries such as Vietnam—that it lacks an overall strategy for addressing
Chinese advances.20 Indeed, Vietnam’s reported decision in July 2017 to back
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018

Winter2018Review.indb 17

5

11/1/17 9:56 AM

18

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 1, Art. 3

down in the face of explicit Chinese threats, rather than to continue exploiting
its own claimed offshore energy resources, provides a recent and disturbing indication of the effectiveness of Beijing’s coercive strategy.21 The lack of top Asiafocused officials in place at the State Department and other key agencies only has
exacerbated this problem.22
As China consolidates existing gains, and perhaps seeks new ones, America’s
strategic options and maneuvering space only will decrease. It is imperative that
U.S. leaders decide what course to follow—whether to roll back, contain, offset,
or accommodate China’s growing influence in the South China Sea.
STRATEGIC OPTIONS
Rollback
The most ambitious strategy would aim to roll back China’s gains—essentially, to
force Beijing to withdraw from key features in the South China Sea (certainly the
artificial features in the Spratly Islands, and perhaps its holdings in the Paracel
Islands as well), or at the very least to demilitarize those features by removing the
military facilities and capabilities. As noted, Rex Tillerson initially appeared to
support such a policy when he called not simply for halting Chinese island building but also for denying Beijing access to artificial islands constructed to date.23
In addition to barring access to the islands, a rollback strategy might seek to force
Beijing to walk back its maritime claims in the South China Sea—in particular,
to abandon the nine-dash line and accept the 2016 arbitral tribunal ruling, which
held that China must derive its maritime entitlements from legitimate claims to
land features.
The core premise of a rollback strategy is that China’s increasing dominance
in the South China Sea poses an unacceptable risk to U.S. interests, and that the
South China Sea will become a “Chinese lake” unless Beijing’s advance is not
simply halted but reversed. By this logic, permitting China to consolidate even its
existing gains will allow it to threaten or disrupt trade flows, rob other Southeast
Asian countries of badly needed economic resources, and strengthen its regional
military position in ways that threaten U.S. freedom of action. Most importantly,
regional states—always sensitive to who is winning the Sino-American competition for influence—will bandwagon with Beijing if they conclude that Washington lacks the capability or will to restore the status quo ante. The United States
therefore should confront China in the South China Sea today, when it still enjoys
a preponderance of military and geopolitical power in the region, rather than
tomorrow, when the balance may have shifted decisively in China’s favor, owing
to Beijing’s rapid economic growth and corresponding military buildup.
Rollback is thus an extremely forward-leaning strategy, one that would rely
heavily on the threat or use of force, as well as other coercive measures, to compel
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/3
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Beijing to pull back. At the most extreme, the United States might attack physically features in the Spratlys or Paracels, or threaten to do so, to eliminate their
military facilities and force a Chinese withdrawal. A less aggressive alternative
would be to blockade or quarantine the islands (on the legal theory that China
enjoys no rights of access to islands it has created illegally), but U.S. forces still
would have to be willing to risk war by intercepting Chinese ships or aircraft
seeking to break the blockade.24 As either a substitute for or complement to these
approaches, the United States might use economic or diplomatic measures—
broadly applied trade sanctions, threats to recognize Taiwan’s independence and
conclude a formal mutual-defense treaty with Taipei, or other relatively dramatic
nonkinetic moves—to generate the coercive pain necessary to persuade China to
relinquish its South China Sea claims.25
The appeal of rollback is obvious, because the strategy—if successful—would
restore U.S. credibility and remove a major threat to American interests in the
Asia-Pacific. And there is little question that, if the United States were willing to
pursue the most aggressive versions of rollback—military assault or blockade—it
could achieve the desired strategic objective. Great gains do not come cheaply,
however, and the risks of this strategy would be tremendous.
First, given the degree to which the Chinese Communist Party has staked its
prestige and legitimacy on standing up to foreign powers in general and asserting expansive claims in the South China Sea in particular, it seems unlikely that
anything short of military conflict actually would suffice to achieve the aims of
this strategy. Retreating in the South China Sea would be a great humiliation for
the Chinese leadership; one imagines that Beijing would be willing to accept a
great deal of pain rather than submit to it. After all, Chinese leaders repeatedly
have made clear that they view the South China Sea as both a part of China
and a vital national interest, and as Fu Ying, chairwoman of the Foreign Affairs
Committee of the National People’s Congress of China, has warned, “The people
won’t tolerate if we lose territory yet again.”26 Washington therefore would have to
be prepared to wage war to remove Beijing from its features in the South China
Sea—and, most likely, to be willing to paint itself as the aggressor by firing the
first shot in that conflict. The United States almost certainly would win such a
conflict—particularly if it occurred in the next few years—but the military costs,
potential for escalation, and reputational costs likely would be severe.
A second, related point is that the United States probably would find most
regional states—which would fear being caught in the middle of a shoot-out between their primary trading partner and their primary security patron—strongly
opposed to such a strategy. Few, if any, regional states—even other South China
Sea claimants—would support rollback openly; it is not hard to imagine U.S. allies such as the Philippines moving further away from Washington and toward
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
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Beijing were the United States to take this approach.27 Rather than upholding U.S.
relationships in the Asia-Pacific, in other words, rollback might weaken them
severely. Finally, even if rollback did not lead to a military conflict, China likely
would respond by imposing costs of its own: ceasing cooperation on an array
of other issues in the relationship—from North Korea to climate change—and
perhaps increasing its coercive activities in the East China Sea, putting additional
pressure on Taiwan, or using economic measures to punish U.S. businesses.
Even in the best-case scenario, then, rollback would lead to a severe disruption
of the bilateral relationship and alienate many U.S. allies and partners; at worst,
it could plunge Washington and Beijing into precisely the military conflict that
American policy makers long have sought to avert. For these reasons, it is highly
unlikely that rollback will be attempted; indeed, not even the most hawkish U.S.
national security experts have advocated such a strategy openly.28
Containment
Should the risks associated with rollback prove prohibitive, a second strategic option is containment. The goal of containment would be to stop China from using
force or coercion to alter any element of the status quo in the South China Sea,
and particularly to prevent it from building additional features or seizing features
held by other nations. The basic logic of this approach is that, while rollback
may be too dangerous, any further erosion of the situation in the South China
Sea is unacceptable. Additional Chinese gains would undercut the credibility of
American leadership and guarantees in the region and risk allowing Beijing to
complete its dominance incrementally. Containment thus would permit Beijing
to keep what it has, but it would draw the line firmly against further advances.
In practice, containment would mean issuing sharp, clear warnings against
further Chinese expansion or coercion, coupled with policies meant to substantiate those warnings. Washington would station substantial military forces in and
near the South China Sea to respond quickly if Beijing sought to seize features
held by other nations; it also might consider landing U.S. forces on features
controlled by American allies and partners to discourage aggressive Chinese
moves.29 To dissuade China from undertaking further land reclamation, the
United States would threaten explicitly to sanction Chinese individuals or entities involved in such activities. Washington would maintain a robust regimen of
FONOPs, preferably in concert with friends and allies from within the region and
beyond, and it would refuse to recognize—and, if necessary, prevent China from
enforcing—any declaration of straight baselines in the Spratly Islands to match
previous illegitimate declarations in the Paracels, or any air defense identification
zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea not limited to accepted interpretations of
international law. Finally, the U.S. government would continue upgrading U.S.
military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific, negotiating additional military-access
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/3
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and -basing arrangements, and enhancing the maritime self-defense capabilities
of Southeast Asian partners and allies, all to ensure that America and its friends
maintain the military superiority and escalation dominance necessary to make
containment credible.
Containment is thus a hard-edged, confrontational policy, one that is heavily reliant on military tools. Yet a primary selling point of containment is that it
is both less risky and less difficult to execute than rollback because it relies on
deterrence—preventing China from seeking new gains—rather than compellence—
requiring China to accept the
China’s offensive is not simply a matter of who humiliation of giving up gains
controls “a bunch of rocks on the other side of it has pocketed already.30 And
while the United States so
the world”; it is a challenge to a series of key
far has struggled even to halt
U.S. interests in the South China Sea and the
China’s advance on any conbroader Asia-Pacific region.
sistent basis, containment has
worked in certain isolated cases that might serve as “proof of concept” for a larger
strategy. In a little-noted incident in 2014, for instance, China stopped seeking to
prevent resupply of Philippine marines stationed on Second Thomas Shoal after
the United States signaled its commitment by placing a maritime surveillance
plane overhead. In this episode, Vice Admiral Robert Thomas, commander of the
U.S. Seventh Fleet, also made a clear statement of U.S. resolve by saying, “Without
going into hypotheticals, the Seventh Fleet is going to support this alliance, period.”31 Similarly, although the United States failed to prevent China from taking
effective control of Scarborough Shoal in 2012, public reports indicate that, in
2016, China backed away from a planned effort to begin land reclamation there
after U.S. officials issued explicit, high-level warnings that doing so might disrupt
seriously the Sino-American bilateral relationship.32
In other words, China may be increasingly assertive, but only when it believes
it can advance without encountering serious resistance. Beijing remains more
risk averse when it comes to actions that could spark a military clash—or even
produce a severe wrench in the relationship—with Washington. China has respected American redlines when those redlines are clearly drawn and seem likely
to be enforced. Containment seeks to raise significantly the risks of further Chinese advances and thereby bring Beijing’s offensive to a halt; it seeks to translate
periodic successes into a more consistent policy of holding the line. And should
China find itself stymied in the South China Sea over a long enough period, containment advocates suggest, Beijing eventually might moderate its behavior and
conclude an equitable diplomatic settlement with its neighbors.
Nevertheless, containment also has significant limitations and liabilities.
Diplomatic difficulties abound. Many U.S. allies and partners are likely to be
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wary of such a policy, in part for fear of antagonizing China, in part for fear that
Washington might lose its nerve should Beijing precipitate a crisis. Moreover, a
policy of helping Hanoi, Taipei, or Manila hold the features that it has occupied
or constructed would cede the moral high ground that Washington has claimed
by championing widely accepted international rules and norms. More seriously
still, containment does not deal with the military capabilities and positions that
China has created already, nor does it prevent Beijing from emplacing additional
capabilities on features it already controls. And, of course, containment requires
the United States to run a significantly heightened risk of severe tensions with
China, to be willing to jolt badly a relationship in which it has many and varied
equities, and to be willing to follow through on its deterrent threats—resulting,
potentially, in a Sino-American war—should Beijing not back down. Critics
of U.S. policy in the South China Sea long have asked whether Washington is
willing to fight a war to stop Chinese salami slicing; containment, like rollback,
ultimately requires answering that question in the affirmative.33
Finally, holding containment in place is likely to become more dangerous
and expensive over time, as China’s ongoing military buildup shifts the strategic
balance in the region. One recent RAND Corporation report indicates that the
“tipping point” in a conflict over the Spratly Islands might come as soon as 2030,
and that China’s risk tolerance only will increase as its military power does.34
Absent major and continuing U.S. military investments, a containment strategy
eventually could become untenable. Containment in the South China Sea thus is
likely to resemble containment as practiced in many other contexts: a potentially
useful policy, but one that is nonetheless difficult, costly, and potentially dangerous to execute, and would require enormous patience and persistence to succeed.
Offset
If U.S. leaders are not willing to accept the risks inherent in more-aggressive
strategies, a third option would be to focus on offsetting—and penalizing—Chinese gains rather than directly preventing them. Washington would respond
to Chinese moves in the South China Sea by imposing costs—diplomatic, economic, and otherwise—on Beijing; it also would work creatively to strengthen the
relative positions of the United States and its allies and partners.35 As its name
implies, this strategy essentially would accept some short-term competitive losses
in the South China Sea in hopes of offsetting those losses through longer-term
competitive gains.36
Logically, an offset strategy derives from a peculiar mix of tactical pessimism
and strategic optimism. Advocates of an offset strategy believe that trying to halt
China’s advances altogether risks danger and disappointment, because China’s
inherent geographical advantages allow it to choose when and where to press.
In addition, the South China Sea simply matters more to Beijing than it does to
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/3
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Washington: while it may be an important interest for America, it is absolutely
crucial for China. Fortunately, advocates of this strategy contend, fully halting
China’s advance is not strategically necessary to uphold the broader U.S. position
in the region.37
Washington may not be able to stop Beijing from dredging up sand at some
isolated reef, for instance, but it can use a range of diplomatic and economic tools
to force China to bear significant costs for such actions. Moreover, it can work
to ensure that Chinese advances are more than matched by upgrades to the U.S.
regional military posture and the deepening of America’s security relationships
with China’s neighbors. By doing so, the United States can make China pay for
each artificial island constructed by ensuring that any tactical advance for Beijing results in a broader strategic loss. Over time, this approach may persuade
Chinese leaders that the game in the South China Sea is not worth the candle;
at the very least, it will minimize, if not cancel out, the strategic benefits that
China reaps from its offensive. The struggle for the South China Sea—and for
the Asia-Pacific more broadly—will be decided not by who controls a few rocks,
proponents of this strategy argue, but by who has the stronger overall position
and who better commands the loyalties of the key regional players. An offset
strategy keeps this bigger, longer-term picture in focus, as it also reduces the risks
of a near-term conflict.
In practice, an offset strategy would accept Chinese changes to the status quo,
so long as those changes did not lead to conflict with the United States or its treaty
allies. Yet Washington would respond to Chinese advances, such as further land
reclamation, by slapping economic sanctions on firms involved in such activities,
by suspending broader bilateral economic initiatives such as negotiation of a
bilateral investment treaty, or by incrementally expanding the U.S. defense relationship with Taiwan or other regional parties. When Chinese advances created
regional unease, the United States would exploit them aggressively by continuing
to broaden defense relationships and opportunities for basing access with countries throughout Southeast Asia and beyond; it also would continue to encourage
Southeast Asian countries to challenge Chinese policy through diplomatic and
legal forums. Not least, America would respond to Chinese assertiveness by deploying more advanced military capabilities to the South China Sea and strategic
points surrounding the area, by exercising and operating more frequently and
more visibly in the region, and by taking concrete steps to strengthen its overall
military posture in the Asia-Pacific. In essence, an offset strategy would entail
demonstrating to Beijing, through a wide array of measures, that its assertiveness
will leave it only more encircled and isolated in the end.
The evident allure of this strategy, of course, is that it offers a chance to win
the region without precipitating a U.S.-China conflict in the process. This is
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precisely why the Obama administration pursued a variant of this approach from
2010 onward. Under Obama, the United States generally declined to provoke
showdowns over particular Chinese advances (with the exceptions noted previously). But it also attempted to upgrade the U.S. alliance with the Philippines,
pursued enhanced partnerships with Southeast Asian partners such as Vietnam,
deployed additional military capabilities to the South China Sea and surrounding areas, and sought to inspire greater regional diplomatic unity in opposing
Chinese coercion. The strategic logic was one of avoiding clashes in areas where
China had the upper hand,
There is no guarantee that this hybrid strategy while simultaneously refocuswill work, of course; were there an obvious so- ing the competition on those
lution to China’s challenge in the South China areas where America’s diverse
regional relationships and
Sea, U.S. policy makers surely would have
greater overall strengths might
found it by now.
give it the strategic edge.
Compelling as the strategy was in theory, however, the Obama years demonstrated that it also had a number of distinct weaknesses and challenges. First and
most obviously, in the near term offset would do little or nothing to prevent China from consolidating existing gains or seeking new ones, with all the negative
consequences—both material and psychological—that flow from that. Indeed,
by not stymieing Chinese advances, the United States risks giving the impression—as it did under Obama—that it is walking back from its declared redlines
because it is either unable or unwilling to stop Beijing’s regional expansionism.
That perception, in turn, may encourage regional states to acquiesce to rather
than resist China’s dominance of the South China Sea; it even may encourage
Beijing to accelerate its drive for primacy.38
Second, if the hope is that cost imposition will affect Chinese decisions over
time, then the costs imposed on Beijing must be quite significant—which once
again raises the risk of significantly upsetting the relationship or triggering an
undesired crisis.39 This was precisely the problem that the Obama administration never could solve adequately. As former administration officials such as Ely
Ratner have noted, the White House was determined to preserve stability in the
overall relationship, and therefore never was willing to impose the higher costs
necessary to make this approach work.40
Third, offsetting Chinese gains by improving the U.S. position and forging a
stronger balancing coalition is easier said than done. Washington spent considerable time and energy upgrading its military and diplomatic relationship with
Manila during the Obama years—only to see that progress jeopardized by the
ascent of Rodrigo Duterte. American diplomats continually prodded ASEAN to
take a firmer position on the South China Sea, but Beijing effectively derailed
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these efforts by using its own economic and diplomatic leverage to keep regional
states divided.41 As a result of these challenges—and U.S. failure to ratify the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which would have linked the United States
more closely to Southeast Asia—China had made short-term gains yet avoided
most long-term costs when the Obama team left office.42
Finally, and related to this point, an offset strategy requires that U.S. officials
continually walk a tightrope: acting aggressively enough to convince regional
actors that Washington is serious about preventing Beijing from dominating the
region, but not so aggressively as to unnerve allies and partners who often try
to avoid explicit alignment. As Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan notes,
“[t]o the countries of Southeast Asia, the American porridge is always going to be
too hot or too cold; countries will always fear the United States entangling them
in its quarrels with rivals or being left to deal with other major powers without
adequate support.”43 An offset strategy may carry advantages, then, but it also
remains fraught with difficulties.
Accommodation
This brings us to a fourth and final strategy available to the United States: accommodation. In contrast to the first three strategies, the goal of accommodation
is not to stop Beijing’s destabilizing behavior ultimately, or even to maintain a
dominant position in the South China Sea and the broader Asia-Pacific region.
The goal, rather, is primarily to avoid conflict with China over the South China
Sea, with a subsidiary objective of conserving the resources that would be needed
to compete more effectively.
To that end, the United States unilaterally would make concessions to wind
down tensions in the South China Sea. It would avoid military, diplomatic, or
legal challenges to Chinese activities, essentially acceding—whether tacitly or
explicitly—to Beijing’s island building, militarization, and coercion of its neighbors. FONOPs would be phased out; military exercises and presence would be
reduced, if not terminated. The United States would maintain its alliances and
security partnerships in the region, but it would make clear that its alliance guarantees do not cover disputed features such as Scarborough Shoal and Second
Thomas Shoal, and it would urge its allies and partners to come to some diplomatic accommodation with Beijing. Just as the British acceded to U.S. primacy
in the Western Hemisphere in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
the United States would accede to Chinese primacy in the South China Sea in the
twenty-first century, and encourage others to do likewise.
The core premise of this approach is that resisting Chinese dominance of the
South China Sea is a fool’s errand. China already controls much of the area, this
argument runs, and there is little that Washington can do short of threatening
—and perhaps waging—war to halt Beijing’s progress. Rather than making
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Scarborough Shoal or Second Thomas Shoal the West Berlin of the twenty-first
century, then, Washington simply should recognize that Beijing’s rise makes it
inevitable that the South China Sea eventually will become a Chinese lake.
Variants of this strategy have been advocated periodically by observers within
the Asia-Pacific region—including Australian strategic thinker Hugh White—
and the logic of the approach is not entirely without merit.44 Certainly, competing
with China in the South China Sea will be costly and potentially dangerous over
time; accommodation would avoid those costs and risks, at least in the short term.
It is undoubtedly true that geography and an asymmetry of interest favor China
in the South China Sea, just as geography and an asymmetry of interest favored
America vis-à-vis Great Britain and other extraregional powers in the Caribbean
in the late nineteenth century;
[F]or the United States to accomplish even the accommodation thus would
limited aims of this approach, it must be will- extricate America from a difficult struggle over distant
ing to accept greater risks, incur higher costs,
waters and limit the danger
and impose more-serious penalties on China
of war with China. Moreover,
than it has been willing to do to date.
given that the South China
Sea is of such great strategic and economic importance to China, it is not beyond
the realm of possibility that Washington—if it acted skillfully—could gain some
marginal Chinese concession on North Korea, climate change, or one of the
myriad other important issues in the bilateral relationship in exchange for giving
Beijing a free hand in the area.45
It seems unlikely, however, that even a complete U.S. capitulation in the South
China Sea would lead Beijing to change its policy fundamentally on North Korea,
Taiwan, or any other key issue, because Chinese leaders surely would assess that
the weakness of the U.S. position on the South China Sea was compelling the
United States to seek such a “grand bargain.” And as tempting as accommodation might be for a country with no shortage of challenges around the globe, the
fact is that the benefits of this approach would be more than offset by powerful
disadvantages.
A strategy of accommodation would undercut U.S. alliances and partnerships in Southeast Asia and beyond, by demonstrating that the United States
is no longer willing to contest Chinese power in this area. Washington thereby
would risk forfeiting the leadership role that the United States long has played
in the region, while perhaps encouraging countries from Vietnam to the Philippines to align with a rising Beijing. Indeed, if the United States cannot summon
the wherewithal to uphold the rules-based order, then American leaders should
not expect smaller states to do so on their own. Moreover, although a policy
of accommodation would reduce the risk of confrontation in the short term,
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it might increase it in the long term. The lesson that Beijing surely would take
away from such an approach is that American redlines are not actually so red
and the country’s “ironclad” alliance commitments are not actually so ironclad;
that perception, in turn, could encourage greater Chinese risk taking that ultimately might transgress a real American redline and bring the two countries
to blows.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, this approach would guarantee Chinese hegemony over the South China Sea, an area that American policy makers
long have deemed to be of vital economic and geopolitical importance to the
United States. It thereby would complicate dramatically any U.S. effort to defend
Taiwan, the Philippines, and other partners and allies in the event of Chinese aggression or coercion. U.S. accommodation also would put China well on the path
to becoming a regional hegemon of the sort America always has felt compelled
to resist. Beijing indeed may have a greater interest in the South China Sea than
Washington does, but it hardly follows that the United States has no interest there
worth defending. Accommodation, in other words, would have devastating effects for the U.S. position in the Asia-Pacific—with no guarantee that it actually
would reduce the danger of an eventual conflict with China.
Fortunately, selecting this undesirable option is unnecessary. China indeed is
pressing assertively for primacy in the South China Sea—but the game is not yet
over. As noted previously, there have been instances (at Second Thomas Shoal in
2014 and Scarborough Shoal in 2016) when Beijing backed down in the face of
strong U.S. warnings and pressure. Yes, the United States has struggled to stem
Chinese advances in the South China Sea on a consistent basis, but where it has
SUMMARY OF SOUTH CHINA SEA STRATEGIC OPTIONS

Rollback

• Physically attack Chinese forces in the South China Sea
• Blockade Chinese forces on South China Sea features until they withdraw
• Apply economic sanctions to force Chinese military to withdraw
• Undermine “core” Chinese interests, such as Taiwan, unless China withdraws

Containment

• Land U.S. forces on features controlled by China’s neighbors
• Provide military support to other South China Sea claimants
• Maintain a large regional military presence, especially near Scarborough Shoal
• Recognize China’s neighbors as rightful claimants of disputed features

Offset

Accommodation

• Enhance U.S. political-military engagement in Southeast Asia
• Impose economic/diplomatic penalties in response to Chinese advances
• Offset Chinese gains with greater U.S. military deployments
• Encourage diplomatic and legal challenges to Chinese activities
• Publicly accept Chinese reclamation, construction, and militarization
• Cease freedom-of-navigation operations in the South China Sea
• Communicate that Washington will not intervene in regional disputes
• Clarify that U.S. commitment to the Philippines excludes the South China Sea

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018

Winter2018Review.indb 27

15

11/1/17 9:56 AM

28

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 1, Art. 3

drawn redlines clearly and appeared ready to enforce them vigorously, China has
not brought the matter to a climax. Were it simply impossible to resist or meaningfully offset the Chinese offensive, then accommodation might make strategic
sense. But it is not impossible to do so, and accommodation thus would be the
strategic equivalent of committing suicide for fear of death.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
So where does this analysis leave the United States? Neither of the extreme options—rollback or accommodation—represents a desirable strategy or an approach that the Trump administration is likely to adopt. Rollback has rhetorical
appeal, but it would require Washington to accept extremely high levels of cost
and risk, and it likely would endanger many of the objectives it is meant to protect.
Indeed, this strategy would require Washington to accept far more risk than U.S.
allies and partners themselves have accepted, a dynamic that is quite incongruous
considering President Trump’s emphasis on the importance of allies’ contributions to their own defense. Conversely, an accommodation strategy effectively
would abandon most of Southeast Asia to China. This would constitute a strategic
disaster for the United States under any administration, but for an administration that has proclaimed itself determined to adopt a “strong” China policy, an
approach that resembles appeasement is likely to be particularly unattractive.46
This leaves two strategic options: containing or offsetting Chinese actions in
the South China Sea. Containment has worked in isolated cases, and it holds
some promise of altering Chinese behavior through deterrence rather than compellence. Yet containment is still a costly and potentially dangerous strategy, one
that an opportunistic adversary presumably will find numerous opportunities to
test in the coming years. An offset strategy, for its part, would have the benefit
of avoiding near-term military confrontations, while focusing U.S. leaders on
the long-term objective of imposing costs on and enhancing regional balancing
against China. Unfortunately, an offset strategy is difficult to execute in its own
right, and, as the experience of the Obama era shows, it risks permitting further
Chinese changes to the status quo and thereby undermining U.S. credibility with
friends and adversaries alike. Containment and offset are certainly superior to
the extreme options, but neither one is an ideal strategy in and of itself.
Containment and offset are not mutually exclusive, however, so the best approach for U.S. policy makers would be to combine the most compelling aspects
of these two strategies, while seeking to avoid some of their associated liabilities.
Specifically, the United States should contain the most destabilizing Chinese activities while offsetting and penalizing less threatening behavior.
The containment elements of a new strategy would demonstrate that the United States is willing to accept short-term risk—including military risk—to prevent
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China from coercing regional states and consolidating control of additional
features in the South China Sea. The United States has shown episodically that
when it draws redlines clearly and credibly threatens to enforce them it can deter
Chinese efforts to take features from other claimants (as with Second Thomas
Shoal in 2014) and to build on contested features (as with Scarborough Shoal in
2016). If U.S. leaders are willing to issue clear deterrent threats, and to back up
those threats with potential military, economic, and diplomatic sanctions, they
may be able to mitigate the worst aspects of Chinese aggression by preventing
Beijing from seizing or reclaiming additional disputed features.
The offsetting elements of the strategy, meanwhile, would seek to ensure that
China suffers long-term losses whenever it obtains any short-term gains coercively. Unfortunately, no U.S. containment policy is likely to prevent China from
using its maritime militia to harass other countries’ vessels, violating the 2016
arbitral tribunal decision, further militarizing its existing artificial islands in the
Spratlys, or declaring an ADIZ around the South China Sea.47 The United States
is just not likely to go to war, or even threaten to do so, in response to such runof-the-mill coercion, and China knows as much. U.S. leaders therefore have little
option but to impose economic and diplomatic penalties on Beijing in response
to such actions, while offsetting such gains by enhancing the U.S. military posture
in the region and working to build regional support for deeper American engagement and tougher policies toward China.
There is no guarantee that this hybrid strategy will work, of course; were there
an obvious solution to China’s challenge in the South China Sea, U.S. policy makers surely would have found it by now. A contain/offset hybrid still will entail
many of the liabilities that inhere in the separate strategies: it will not reduce
China’s existing military-geopolitical footprint, for instance, nor will it preclude
all forms of Chinese assertiveness and coercion in the region. This strategy, moreover, will be difficult to execute—for all the reasons spelled out previously—and
will become ever harder to implement over time as China’s power grows. Indeed,
for the United States to accomplish even the limited aims of this approach, it
must be willing to accept greater risks, incur higher costs, and impose moreserious penalties on China than it has been willing to do to date. A contain/offset
strategy will not allow U.S. policy makers to avoid dangerous crises and daunting
dilemmas—even if it does represent the best approach for navigating them deftly
enough to preserve America’s key interests in the South China Sea.
America has limped along without a clear or coherent approach in the South
China Sea for several years. Now is the time to get serious about strategy—before
it is too late.
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